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[L. lI... No. 27150. In Bank. Apr. 18,1963.]

HENRY CASTANEDA, Petitioner v. THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent;
THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
[11 Searches and Seizures-Incidental to Arrest-Search of Premises.-Though there was reasonable cause to arrest an accused
without a warrant, a search of his home was not justified
as incidental to his arrest where it was at a distance from
the place of his arrest and was not contemporaneous therewith.
[21 Id.-Consent.-To protect his right to object to ltn unreasonable search or seizure, n defendant need not forcibly resist an
officer's assertion of authority to enter his home or search it
or his person, but if he freely consents to entry or search, or
voluntarily produces evidence against himself, his constitutional rights are not violated and any search or taking of evidenee pursuant to his consent is not unreasonable.
[31 Id.-Oonsent.-Whether in a particular casc an apparcnt consent to search or seizure W:lS in fnet voluntarily given or was
in submission to an express or implied assertion of authority
is a question of fact to be determined in the light of all the
circumstances.
[4] Id. - Oonsent. - Although not conclusive in determining
whether consent to a search and srizure has been given, a
circumstance of partic.ular significance is a defendant's custody at the time of the request for his permission to search;
where he has submitt('d to arrest, or h; in jail, he knows thnt
he is virtually powerless to pre,cnt the sC'arch.
[5] Id.-Oonsent.-The prosecution failed to discharge its burden
of showing that an accused consented to a search of his home
where it appeared that the accused was not only under arrest
at the time of the alleged consent, but was also handcuffed at
all times nntil he was finally taken to jail several hours nfter
his arrest, and had no choice but to go wherever the officers took
him, where he knew that the officers wi:::hed to search his home
and that if they did thpy would find evidence against llim,

[lJ See Oal.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 49; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Seizures (ht ed § 16).
[2J See Oal.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 40; Am.Jur.,
Searches and Sl'izures (1st cd § 71).
licK. Dig. Refel'ences: [1J Searehe!! and Seizure!!, § 29; [2-5J
Searches and Seizures, § 22; [6J Searches and Seizures, § 1L
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and whl're he repeatedly alll·lIIph·!l til It'ad till' IIffiel'rs lIwny
from his house, nud after such ("rorts faill'l1, Ill' wns neit.lwr
Mkcd to nor did he exp\,('s,; his ('t)II~I'nt thut the ,;ea1'ch eontinue; such effort" by the :teemed I\HIIII' it 1.'1"111' thnt he did
lIot fl'(,l'ly nnll vohmtal'il.\· ('onO"'lIt tn the i'(':lI'eh of his home.
[6] Id.-Search Warrants-Determination of Necessity for.Where a search of au aecused's hOllle was neither I~ons('uted to
nor incident to his arrest, but WIlS at II distnnce thl'ref1'om
and not COlltcUlP01'1l111'OUS thercwith, he had the right to have
1\ magistrate determine whether there WitS rensouublc cause to
search his hOl\le Itnd whcth"r a search warrant should therefore
issue.

PROCEEDING in prohibition to prewllt the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County and III'rbert V. Wall:; (' r, Judge
thereof, from trying petitioner 011 a criminal charge. Pel'emptory writ granted.
Frank C. Wood, Jr., for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
William B. McKesson, District Attorney, Harry Wood,
Robert J. Lord and Harry B. Sondheim, Deputy District
Attorneys for Real Party in Interest.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and Gordon Ringer, Deputy Attorney General, as Amici Curiae on b('half 9f RI'al Party in
Interest.
TRAYNOR, J.-By information petitioner was charged
with possession of heroin in violation of Health and Safety
Code, section 11500. His motion to set aside the· information
on the ground that the evidence against him was obtained by
an illegal search and seizure was denied, and he now seek!'!
prohibition to prevent hi!'! trial. (See Badilln v. RllPCl'iol'
Court. 46 Ca1.2d 269, 271 [294 P.2d 23].)
Evidence was presented at the preliminary hearing of the
following facts: On November 21, 1961, Deputy Sheriff Copping of the narcotics detail; of the Los An~eles sheriff'R office
and three other officers went to John Spade's hou!'!c in Lynwood. They had no arrest or search warrant. Deputy Copping knew that Spade was a narcotics addh·t and llRd received information of narcotics traffic at hiR house. Thc of-
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fil'l'l'S lll'l'iwd about 7 :30 p.m. and put the house under surwillath·e. About 7 :45 p.m. S01l1eOne arrived in a ear, entered
the house. fo:tayell about 15 minutes, and then drove away.
About 8 :30 p.m. two people :1l'riYcd in a car, parked in the
dri\'eway, tlllll l'utered the hou"e. .About 9 p.m. one officer went to the front door, another ofi1cer Wl'llt to the back
door, and Deputy Copping allll th(' f'lurth officcl' WI'11t to the
kitchen door at the side of tlll' honse. Through an open win(low, Dcputy Copping saw Spade standing in the kitchen.
His left sleeve was rolled up, and he had an eyedropper and
hypodermic ncedle ill his right hand. He concluded that
Spade had just finished or was taking an injcetion of narcotics. While Deputy Copping was waiting for the other officers to get set, Spade opened thc door. and Deputy Copping
arrested him and entered the kitclll'n. Petitioner and a third
person, Trejo, were present. From their appearance and behavior, Deputy Copping conl'luded that they were u110er the
influence of narcotic8. \Yltile the other officers stayed in the
kitchen with petitioner and Trejo, Deputy Copping took
Spade into allother room. Sparle told him that the heroin
had all been shot up and that he had put the narcotics outfit
back under the sink, where the officers found it. They arrested Spade, Trejo, and pf.'titioner. Deputy Copping knew
petitioner as a person who had been named by several addicts as their source of nan:oties, and he had participated in
the surveillance of petitioner's hou"e oyer a period of several
months.
The officers handcuffed pctitioner before leaving Spade's
house, and Deputy Copping asked him if he had any more
narcotics at his house. He said he did not. "I asked him if we
could look, and he a8ked me if I had a search warrant. I
stated I did not have a search warrant, and I would not need
one if he would give me con8ent, at which time he gave me ronsent. Q. What did he say T A. He said you could go ahead
and look." Deputy Copping and one of the other officers took
petitioner with'them in their car and started toward his
house at 305 West Bennett in Compton. Deputy Copping
asked pctitioner where he liYed; and petitioner said that he
lived at 1430 'l'alllal'il1cl Stt"·,,t ill Compton. He was asked i.f
he was sure, and then said" All right. You guys know where
I live." When they art'iwll at 305 West Bennett, petitioner
said, "I don't live here; I live over here," and pointed to
303 West Bennett. He knOl'ked on the door, and his aunt let

)
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him and the officers in. The officers asked petitioner's aunt if
he lived there and she said, "No, he livrR across the way."
Petitioner said, "1\lary, don't tell tht'lll noth ing. Mary, don't
tell them nothing. "
The officers took dl'felldallt from a03 to 30iJ \\\'8t BelllH'tt,
where a young girl was sitting with petitioner's four minor
children. She told the officers that petitioner lived there.
They asked petitioner again if he had any narcoties in the
house, and he said, "All right, I will tell you where they
are." Petitioner directed the officers to his mother's house at
1413 'l'amarind Street and told them that there were narcotics on a raftcr in the garage. The officers looked and
found nothing. They then took petitioner back to 305 West
Bennett and seal'rlwd the house in his presence. They discovered a quantity of }l('roin, which was admitted in evidence
at the preliminary hearing oyer ohjection to establish the
corpus delicti of the crime charged.
[1] Although it is not disputed that the officers had reasonable cause to arrest petitioner without a warrant when
they discowred him at Spade's hous(', the search of petitioner's home cannot be justified as incidental to his arrest, "for
it was at a distance from the place thereof and was not contempol'anevus therewith. [Citations.]" (People v. Gorg, 45
Ca1.2d 776, 781 [271 P.2d 469] ; Tompkins v. Superior COllrt,
ante, pp. 65, 67 [27 Cal.Rptr. 880, :378 1'.2d 113].)
The People contend, ho'n~Yer, that the evidence is sufficient
to support the committing magistrate's implied finding that
petitioner freely consented to the s:'ardl or his homc. [2] In
People v. JUcharZ, 45 Ca1.2c1 751, 753 [290 P.2d 852], we
stated: "To protect his right to object to an unreasonable
search or seizure a defendant need not forcibly rrsist an officer's assertion of authority to enter his home or search it or
his person [citations], hut if he fred)' consents to an entry or
search, or voluntarily produces evidence against himself,
his constitutional rights are not violated and any search or
taking of evidence pursuant to his consent is not unreasonable. [Citations.J [3] Whether in a particular case an apparent consent was in fact Yo1tmtarily given or was in submission to an express or implied a~sertioll of autllOrity, is a question of fact to be determined in 'the light of all the circumstances." (See also People v. B1l1·!cc, 47 Ca1.2d 45, 49 [301 P.
2d 241].) In the present case the testimony of Deputy Copping dispels any inference that might otherwise have been
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from lwtitiolll'r's words of cOllsent that he freely and
voluntarily cOlls('nted to the search of his home.
[4] Although not conclusiv(', ".A circumstance of particular significance is a defendant's custody at the time of the request for llis permission to scarch, for where he has submitted
to arrest, or is in jail, he knows that he is virtually powerless to prevcnt the search. [Citations.]" (Peoplev. Gorg,45
Ca1.2d 776, 782, fn. 2 [291 P.2d 469].) [5] In the present
case, petitioner was not ouly under arrest, but he was handcuffed at all times until he was finally taken to jail several
hours aftcr his arrest, and he had no choice but to go whereever the officers took him. He knew that the officers wished
to search his home and that if they did so they would find
evidcnce against him. He repeatedly attempted to lead the
officers away from his home, and after these efforts failed, h('
was neither asked to 1101' did he express his consent that tIle
search continue. These efforta nake abundantly dear that
petitioncr did not freely and voluntarily consent to the search
of his home. The most that can be inferred is that petitioner
sought to placate thc officers and hoped that by agreeing to
the search of other premises, he would forestall the search of
his home and the discovery of incriminating evidence. We do
not condone petitioner's efforts to mislead the officers. [6] It
bears emphasis, ho\vever, that petitioner was under no duty to
assist the officers in securing evidence against him. Since the
search was not incident to his arrest, he had the right to
have a magistrate determine whether there was reasonable
cause to search his home and whether a search warrant should
therefore issue. (Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610,
613-616 [81 S.Ot. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828, 831-8331; Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 [68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436,
439-4401; AgncZlo v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32-33 [46
S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145, 148-149, 51 A.L.R. 409, 413~4141.)
" 'Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has
interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police.
This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a
safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in
order to enfodle the law. The right of privacy was deemed too
precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the
detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.'" (People
v. Tarantino, 45 Ca1.2d 590, 594 [290 P.2d 505], quoting
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 [69 S.Ct. 191,
dl'UWlI
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H3 L,Rd, 153, 158],) PetitiOlH'I' did liot fOl'fl'it that righl
hy his ('fforts to wish'all tll(' olli,:CI'S, At the pl'elilllinul'y bt'llring thl' burdcn was 011 thc JII'Ol)Celltioll to prl'Selit substantial
(,,"jll,'uee of COII..;Cllt to the sl'arch (Badillo v. SupfI'ior COlIl't.
·Hi Ca1.2d 26!l, 272 [294 P,2d 23]), nud it failt'd to tliSt:ilUl'gl'
l!ia t UUI'J('U,

r;et the pel'l'llIptory writ isslte as pl'aY(,ll.
Gibsou, C. J., Peters,J"Tobriller, J., and Peek, J., eonI'I1rred.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting-On tll!' facts which nrc shown
to have becn known to the arresting otTieel's I am of tltt' vi,'\\'
that the scarch was justified, The justifying facts appear to
intlu{le the following items: (1) the criminal ('onLinet of the
petitioner's companions immediately precl'ding his arr('st;
(~) the bl'haviorof petitioner hims('1f at that time and following his arrest; (3) the information which the officl'l's had
that petitioncr was an established tl'afticl,er ill illl'~al nal'cotics; (4) the inferences that petitioner had snpplil'd thl' drug
which Spade had injected, and that as a regular supplier
petitioner would have cached away a further stock of the
{'olltraband, These are inferences which, I thinl{, officers experienced and skilled in detecting and apprehending suppliers of illegal narcotics would properly have drawn from
the above related probative facts.
Furthermore, I think it should occur to t11e office)';; that
this petitioner would probably have an accomplice who,
promptly following petitioll('r '8 a1'l'('st (and disapP{,lll'allCC of
the law enforcement officers), wonM T('lllove and secrete or
destroy any contraband whidl mig-ht otherwise he found jn
petitioner's home, or ill any otlll'}, p1ac(' which might be ('011ycniently available to him. Accordingly, such officers would
det'm it to be only diligent discharge of duty to immediately
pursue the clues before them, This they did, expeditiously,
illtelligently and successfully.
For the reasons indicated I would discharge the lllte1'uuth-e, and deny ~tbe peremptory, writ of prollibitioll.

)

McComb, J., concurred.
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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CURTIS RAY
MICKELSON, Defpllclant and Respondent.
[la,lb] Searches and Seizures-Investigations Falling Short of
Search.-The rule that cil'Clllllstlln('es short of probable cause
to make an arrest Illay still justify an officrr's stopping pedestrians or motorists on the street for questioning does not conflict with U.S. Const., 4th Amend., forbidding unreasonable
searches and seizures, but strikes a balance between a person's interest in immunity from police interference and the
community's interest in law enforcement, and wards off pressure to equate reasonable cause to investigate with reasonable
cause to arrest, thus protect.ing the innocent from the risk of
arrest when no more than reasonable investigation is justified.
[2] Id.-Validity of Police Procedure.-A state mle goYcl'lIill'.;
police procedure with respect to searches and seizures is not
unconstitutional merely because it permits conduct in which II
federal officer may not lawfully engage.
(3] Id.-Validity of Police Procedure.-Before a state mIl' governing police conduct with respect to searches and st·izurc~
may be struck down, it must appear that neither Congress 1W1'
a state. legislature could authorize it; if a state adopts rules
of police conduct consistent with the requirements of U.S.
Const., 4th Amend., forbidding unreasonable searches and
seizures, and if its officers follow those rules, they do not act
unreasonably within the meaning of the amendment although
different rules may govern federal officers.
(4] Id.-Search of Vehicles-Reasonable Cause.-Although it was
not unreasonable for a police officer to stop an automobile.
for investigation and to take reasonable precautions for his
own safety in view of the fact that the driver's description
was similar to the description, previously given to the. officer,
of the robber of 11 market, a search of the automobile which
turned up evidence conn('cting a passenger in the vehicle
to burgln1'i!:'s of telephonc booths exceeded the bounds of
reasonable investigation and was not justified by probable
[1] Sce Cal.Jur.2!t, Searches and Seizures, § 31.
[4] Search of automobile without warrant by office.rs relying on
description of persons suspected of 8. crime, note, 60 A.L.R. 299.
See also Cal.Jur.2d, Searches and Seizures, § 43 ; Am.Jur., Searches
and Seizures (1st ed § 18).
McK. Dig. References: [1] Searches and Seizures, § 6; [2, 3]
Searches and Seizures, § 1; [4] Searches and Seizures, § 3L
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c:luse to make an a1'I'e::;t whel'e thl'l'eCuult1 have been more
than one pcrson abroad at night who fitted till' cll·scription of
the market robber, where the driver, though ill the vicinity
of the rohbery, was not obser\'ed until about .20 minutes after
it occul'l'l'd when he was driving towarcl the SCl'ne of the crime,
not away from it, whl'l'e the ollieer's ill\"estigntion elicited
identification on requelSt 1111(\ a l:itoq .collsist.'nt with the automobile's movements allll the ollicel"s own assessment of those
movements, and whel'e the OCCUIJlUlts of the car were out of the
car and away from any weapoll::; that might have been concealed therein.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County setting aside an information. Walter R.
Evans, Judge.· Affirmed.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E, James, Assistant Attorllt'y General, 'ViUiam B. McKessoll, District Attorney, Harry 'Vood and Harry Sondheim, Deputy District
Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Gladys Towles Root, Eugene V. McPherson and Philip C.
Greenwald for Defendant aud Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defelldant was charged in two counts of
an information with cOlUmitting burglaries of telephone booths,
in violation of Penal Codt', section 459. His motion to set
aside the information was granted (Pen. Code, § 995), and
the People appeal. The Attorney General concedes that there
was 110 evidence at the preliminary hearing to support count I
and seeks a reversal only as to count II.
A Burbank police officer discovered the physical evidence
supporting count II in the course of searching an overnight
bag fOUlld under the front seat of an automobile in which
defendant had bcen riding and which Don Zauzig had been
driving. The bag contained $85,90 in nit'kels, dimes, and quarters. At defen~ant's preliminary hearing, the bag and its
contents were introduced ill evidence, and Zanzig testified
to his and defcndant's comDlissi~n of the burglary. Zausig's
arrest and his availability as a ,,~itness were direct results of
the search that disclo::ed the' physical evidt'nee of the burglary.
If that search was illrgal,neither the physical evidence nor
Zauzig's testimony is competent to support the information.
• Aaaiped by Chairman of Judicial CounciL
•

)
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(SilVCl'th01'l1C Lbr. Co. v. Unitcd Stales, 2;'1 U.S. 385, 392
l40 S.l!t. ]82, 6.J: L.Rd. 319, :.l21, 24 .A.I.J.H. l..J:26, 1428];
Wciss v. l.illitcd Slat.'s, 308 U.S. 321, 330-3lJ1 [60 S.Ct. 269,
84 L.Rll. 298, 303J ; Nardollc Y. r;lIitcd States, 308 U.S. 338,
341 [60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307, 311-312]; Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 [83 S~Ct.407,417, 9 L.Ed.2d
441] ; People v. Bagm', 4,1 Ca1.211 459, 462 [282 P.2d 509] ;
People v. Di:J;on, 46 Ca1.2d 456, 458 [296 P.2d 557] ; Pcople
v. Sehaumloffcl, 53 Cu1.2ll 96, 101-102 [346 P.2d 393];
People v. Ditson, 57 Ca1.2d 415, 439 [20 Cal.Rptr. 165, 369
P.2d 714].)
The Attorney General contends, however, that the arresting
officer had reasonable cause to arrest Zauzig for a rce~llt robbery in the neighborhood and that the search of the car was
therefore justified as incidental to the arrest. Before thc d,'cision of the United States Supreme Court in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 [81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081], ''"''
,vere free to determine such an issue under the Califol'llia
decisi9ns setting forth the rules governing police inwstigations and arrests. In view of the holding in that case that the
Fonrteenth Amendment requires state courts to exelude unconstitutionally obtained evidence, we must determine at the
outset whether the federal rules governing police invcf,tigations and arrests have superseded our own. rrht'l'l! are
significant differences bet,veen the respective rules that are
relevant to this case.
In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 [80 S.Ct. 168,
4 L.Ed.2d 134, 139], the United States Supreme Court held
that an arrest occurs when an automobile is stopped during
the course of a criminal investigation, and if the officer docs
not have reasonable cause to arrest the occupant at that time,
the arrest is unlawful. Anything the officer learns as a result
of stopping the automobile is inadmissible in eyidence and
cannot justify a search. (See also Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 166 [69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Eel. 1879, 1885]; Rios
v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261-262 [80 S.Ct. 143], 4
L.Ed.2d 1688, 1693"1694].) [1a] In this state, however,
we have eonsistently held that circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest ~ay still justify an officer's
stopping pedestrians or motorists on the streets for questioning. If the circumstances warrant it, he may in self-protection
request a suspect to alight from an automobile or to submit
to a superficial search for concealed weapons. Should the
investigation then reveal probable cause to make an arrest, the

I
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officer may alTest the susped and cOIlJnd a reasonable incidental search. (l'coplc v. Simon, 4.) Ca1.2J 645, 650 [290
P.2d 531] ; People v. Martin, 46 Cal.:!ll 106, 108 [293 P.2d
52] ; People v. Blodgctt, 4G ('a1.2<1 114, 117 [293 P.2d 57] ;
Pcople v. BetICrly, 200 Ca1..\pp.:2d 119, 125 [19 CaJ.Rptr.
67]; People v. King, 17;) Cal.App.2d 386, 390 [346 P.2d
235] ; People ", .1l1l1s/tct'itz, ]83 Ca1.App.2d 752, 755 [6 Cal.
Rptr.78;)].)
The Mapp case did not determine whether or not the states
must follow all the federal rules. :Neither did Elkins v.
United States, 364 V.S. 206 [80 S.Ct. 1437, 1453, 4 L.Ed.2d
1669], which Oil this mutter held only that the con dud of
state offieers would be lllcilsmed a~aillst the federal rules
when state-secured evidence was offered in federal prosecutions.
[2] A state rule governing police procedure is not unconstitutional merely because it pl'l'mits conduct in which a federal officer may not lawfully engage. The Fourth Amendment! itself sets forth 110 more than the basic outlines of
lawful law enforcement. It bccomes mcaningful in specific
situations only by reference to the common law and statutory
law governing the issuance of warrants, the authority of
officers, and the power to arrest. Illegally obtained evidence
may be excluded by the federal courts for various reasons.
It may be excluded because it was obtained in a way that
could not constitutionally be authorizcd. It may be excluded
because it was obtained in violation of a federal statute or
a common-law rule or a state rule applicable to federal
officers. It may be exclnded by yjrtue of the Supreme Court's
monitorship of the federal administration of criminal justic('.
(Fed. R. Crim. Proc., 3, 4,26,41; 18 U.S.C. App., pp. 34073452 (1958).)
The United States Supreme Court has not interpreted the
Fourth Amendment as requiring that court to day down as a
matter of constitutional lmv pre('is'2 rules of police conduct.
Indeed, its rule allowing a srarch by a federal officer without
a warrant as incident to a lawful arrest permits reference to
state law to detl'rmine the validity of the arrest. (Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. I?, 15 [68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436,
'''The right of H,c people to I)c sl'cure ill their pcrsons, houses, papers,
and effects, against un ",~a~onal ,Ie SCarl'hCR and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly dcscribing the place to be
8earched, and the persons or things to be seized."
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·H1] ; United State.~ v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 589 [68 s.n. 222,
92 L.Ed. 210, 217].) [3] Accordingly, bcfol'e a state rule
governing police conduct lIlay be struck down, it must IlPlwar
that neither Congress nor a state legislature could authori:~,'
it. If a state adopts rules of police conduct cOllsistent with
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and if its officers
follow those rules, they 00 not act unreasonably within the
meaning of the amendmrut although different rules llIay
govern fcderal officers.
[1 b] We do not believe that our rule permitting temporary
detention for questiouing conflicts with the Fourth Amendment. It strikes a balance between a person's iuterest in immuuity from police iuterference and the commuuity's interest
in law enforcement. It wards off pressure to equate reallonable cause to investigate with reasonable cause to arrest, t}ms
protecting the inlloccnt from the risk of arrrst whrll no mor!'
than reasonable investigation is justified. (See Barrett, Prrsonal Rights, Pl'opm·ty Rights, alld The Fou.rth A.mendment,
1960 Sup.Ct. Rev. 46,65-66,69-70.)
The United Statl's Supreme Court apparently concluded that
the situations presented in the Henry, Rios, and Brinegar
cases allowed no middle ground (see dissenting opinion of
Jackson, J. in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183
[69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1894]), and hence that the
officers were not justified in stopping the defendants' automobiles unless they had probable cause to make arrests. It
does not follow that its cOllclul'lioll was constitutionally compelled. Given the absence of legislation, the court had to
articulate the governing rule and enforce compliance with it.
It did not thereby foreclose Congress or the states from articulating other reasonable rules consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.
[ 4] It remains to determine whether the srarch in this case
complied with the rules of this state. The arresting officer
testified that he arrested defendant aud Zauzig shortly before
2 a.m. about 20 minutes after he had gOlle to a market on
San Fernando Road where a robbery had just bcen reported.
He was told by other officers at the market that the robber
was a fairly tall white man of large build with dark hair
who was wearing~a red sweater and armed with a .45 automatic. The officer searched the area on foot for about 10
minutes and then rl'turned to his car to scareh a wider area.
While driving west on Providellcia about six blocks from the
market he saw a station wagon coming toward him with two
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JH'l':;OIlS ill it. Till' driWL" aPI"'a\'l'd to be a larg" white man
with dat'k hait' wl'ariug' a "I't! SWl'utel' 01' jaekd, The officer
saw thc :;tatiou wagon tUl'll sonth 011 San Fernando toward
the IIHIl'ket, and hc tlll'l1etl south into an alley and then west
at the next stl'l'l't, Ill' then saw the station wagon turn west
f,'om San l·'et'lIlllldo on the sallie street and followed it, The
station WUgOll wellt to the cud of the street wll('re it came
to 11 lh'adend, 1llaue a U-t 111'11, aud proceeded back toward
San Fernando, 'rIte officer ci,'c1cd a block to his right and
tut'llt'll sonth 011 San PCt'11l1lldo, He was then a blod;: or two
hehind the station wugon, wllith was traveling :;outl1 011 San
:;!'el'il:lntlo at about 25 or :30 miles pel' hour, The offil.:('l' oyertook the station wagon alld obsl'l'Ved the rassl'llger "bend
;'0I'\\,:1r(} in the s,'at, fOi'\\'l\l'(l and dow'n and rais::! back up,"
He tumed on his red light, the station wagon pulled over
:L1111 stopped, alllI tlle oftil.'er pm'ked behind it,
lIe radioed
his location to ht'nllquat'tl'I's nnd l'e1luested a bnelmp car for
a!o;sist/mce, Meanwhile Zilll7ig got out of the dl'ivt:'r's seat of
the station wugoll and walkt>d to the officer's ear, The officer
asl,ed Zauzig wlll'l'l! he was going', aud Zanzig' told him he
was going hOIll(' to UIC'ndale, that he was lUore or less lost,
and had heen driying up aull down sidestrt'ets looking for the
fl'eeway, He :,:howed the officer his driY!:'r's license, The
assisting officpl'S al'l'iv('u, alltl the officf'l's and Zauzig walked
to the station wagon, Defentlallt was sittillg' in the right front
seat and got out 011 request, The arresting officer looked
under the right fl'~lllt seat and on the floorboards and saw an
overnight bag stuffed undl'r the right front seat, He pulled
it out, unzipped it, alld saw foul' sCi'cwdrh'ers, a flashlight, a
pair of canvas glovl'3 and two socks, Olle Hock was knotted
at the top and was filled with something that jingled, \Vhen
he took the hag out of the car, the officer asked Zauzig wllat
it was, aud Zallzig told him that it was his basl,etball equipment, The officer u"ked what was in thc sock, and Zauzig
told him that he llad some dimes, The officer opened the
sock and found llickds. dimes, and quarters, He arrested
Zauzig and dl,f0lHlant Oil suspicion of burglary, The officer
also testified that thl'l'e was lIothing in his conversation with
Zauzig that \\'ould it'llicate that he had p<:'l'pet1'ated a robbery
other than that he adcd II hit fl'it'IHlIy, The lllevelllents of
the car were sudl that. it was plJvious that the oeeupants were
either tryillg to ('vade tlw officer or were confused and did
1I0t know the art'a VC\'Y wl'11. His purpose in examining the
bag was the "possibility of a gun being there." After he
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had talked to Zau;..ig aad (It'l'l111Iant he was satisfied that they
ha(lllot bel'l} involved ill till' i'ohbel'Y.
It "as not ul\l"easollaille for tli(' of!1el'l' to stop Zauzig's car
for illwlStigatiou and to takc reasonable precautions for his
own safety. He did not have prohablc canSt', however, to
arrest Zauzig for robbery. There could have been 1I\0re than
one' tail white lllall with dark hairwNll'ing' a red sweater
abroad at llig-ht .ill such a llIl'tropolitanat·ea. .Although Zauzig was ill the viciuity of the robhery, he was 110t ob:;en'ed
until ~tbout 20 lllinut('s after it on'Ill'l'nl wlH'1l hI' was driving
toward the ::;celle of the crime, not away from it. The officer
had 110 informution that the robber hat! an automobile or a
confedcrlltc. 'fhe Nratic route of the car und defendant's
mOYl'lllcllt ill the scat were at 1110st suspicion;; eireumstances.
The officer's iuvc!>tigatiollrlieited id('ntifieation upon reqnest
and a story consistent 'with the movements of the car and
the officer's own assessment of those movements. Both occupauts were out of the car away from any weapons tllat might
haYe heen concealcd therein. Instead of interrogating Zau7.ig and defendant with respect to the robbery or rcquestil\~
them to aecompany the officers the few blocks to the market
for possible identification, the officer elected to rummnge
through closed baggage found in the car in the hope of turning up evidence that might connect Zauzig with the robbery.
'fliat search exceeded the bounds of reasonnble investigation.
It was not justified by probable cause to make an arrest, and
it cannot be justified by what it turned up. (People v. Brown,
45 Ca1.2d 640, 643-644 [290P.2d 528].)
The ordl'r is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Tobriner, J., and PeE'k, J., concurred.
PETERS, J.-I concur.
I agree that the seareh hl'1'e involved was illegal, both under
state and federal law. Therefore, I agree that the order
appealed from must be affirmed. But, in my opinioll, such
holding makes it unnCCl'ssary to discuss the scope and impact
on state law of the decision of lrlapp v. Ohio, 367 F.8. 643
[81 S.Ct. 1684,.6 L.Ed.2d 1081]. In my opinion the determination of that important cOIl'ititutional qu('stion should be
left to a case where it is directly involved.
McCOMB, J.-I disscnt. I would l'cV('l'se the order of the
trial court as to count II and afl1rlll the order as to count I,
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for the l"l'a;sons expressed by Mr. Presiuillf! Justicc Fox in the
opillion pl"l'pared by him '::or the District Court of .Appeal
in J>COl)lc v. Mickelson (Cal.App.) 26 Cal.Rptr. 152.
Appellant's petition for a rL'llcaring \"as ueni,'u l\Iay 14,
1963. McComb, J., was of thc opinion that the petition should
be granted.
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